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ABORTION AND BIRTH CONTROL—UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT DECLARES TEXAS’ RESTRICTIONS ON
ABORTION FACILITIES UNCONSTITUTIONAL: IMPACT ON
STATES WITH SIMILAR ABORTION RESTRICTIONS
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016)
ABSTRACT
In Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt et al., the United States
Supreme Court held unconstitutional two controversial provisions of a
Texas law, which subjected abortion clinics to ambulatory surgical center
standards and required their physicians to obtain admitting privileges at
nearby hospitals. The Court reasoned that both the surgical center
requirement and the admitting privileges requirement provided few, if any,
health benefits to women, posed a substantial obstacle in the path of women
seeking abortions, and constituted an “undue burden” on abortion access.
The Court concluded that the provisions were unconstitutional.
Additionally, the Court held that res judicata did not bar the petitioners’
challenge to either the admitting privileges requirement or the surgical
center requirement. Last, the Court considered Texas’ three additional
arguments and deemed none persuasive. Whole Woman’s Health is likely
the most significant abortion case in a quarter-century. This case reaffirms
the “undue burden” standard provided in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and will likely
impact abortion restrictions in numerous other states, including North
Dakota.
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I.

FACTS

In July 2013, the Texas Legislature enacted House Bill 2 (“H.B. 2”),
which contained two controversial restrictions on abortion facilities in
The “admitting privileges requirement” provided that “[a]
Texas.1
physician performing or inducing an abortion . . . must, on the date [of
service], have active admitting privileges at a hospital . . . located not
further than 30 miles from the” abortion facility.2 The “surgical center
requirement” mandates that an abortion facility meet the “minimum

1. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300-01 (2016).
2. Id. at 2300 (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a) (West 2015)).
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standards . . . for ambulatory surgical centers” under Texas law.3 The
petitioners, a group of Texas abortion providers, challenged the restrictions
as unconstitutional.4 The petitioners claimed the restrictions violated the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution as interpreted in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey.5 In Casey, the Court concluded
that a provision of law is constitutionally invalid if the “purpose or effect”
of the provision “is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion.”6
The respondents, the State of Texas and its elected officials, argued
both the admitting privileges requirement and the surgical center
requirement protected women’s health and were, thus, constitutional.7 A
“[s]tate has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion . . . is performed
under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient.”8 The
respondents contended that the petitioners’ constitutional claims were
barred by res judicata.9 Lastly, respondents made three additional
arguments for why the invalidation of both challenged provisions was
precluded.10
Before H.B. 2 took effect, a group of Texas abortion providers filed an
action in federal district court, Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex.
Surgical Health Serv. v. Abbott, seeking facial invalidation of the law’s
admitting privileges provision.11 The district court granted an injunction in
favor of the abortion providers.12 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
subsequently vacated the injunction and upheld the admitting privileges
provision.13 The abortion providers did not file a petition for certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court.14
One week after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Abbott, the petitioners
(many of whom were plaintiffs in Abbott) filed the present lawsuit in
federal district court.15 The district court ruled in favor of the petitioners

3. Id. (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 245.010(a) (West 2015)).
4. Id. at 2301.
5. Id.
6. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
7. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2311, 2315.
8. Id. at 2296 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973)).
9. Id. at 2305.
10. Id. at 2318.
11. Id. at 2300.
12. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F.
Supp. 2d 891, 901 (WD Tex. 2013)).
13. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (citing Abbott, 734 F.3d at 419).
14. Id. at 2301.
15. Id.
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and enjoined the enforcement of the two provisions.16 The Fifth Circuit
later reversed the district court’s ruling, holding that the admitting
privileges requirement and the surgical center requirement were
unconstitutional.17 As a result, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari
and the United States Supreme Court granted review.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The constitutionality of laws regulating abortion is one of the most
controversial issues in American law.18 In Roe v. Wade, the seminal 1973
abortion case, the United States Supreme Court ruled that women possess a
fundamental right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy by having an
abortion.19 In Roe, the Court explained that this fundamental right springs
from the constitutional rights of privacy and liberty arising under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 The Roe Court concluded
that the government could restrict the right to abortion, if the restriction was
necessary to fulfill a “compelling” government interest.21 The Court
explained that the right must be measured against the state’s interests in
safeguarding health, maintaining medical standards, and in protecting life.22
Approximately twenty years after Roe, the Supreme Court modified its
view on government regulation of abortion.23 In Casey, the Court said the
government could regulate abortion, but only to protect women’s health,
not to limit access to abortion.24 Any restriction must not impose an “undue
burden” on a woman seeking an abortion, and the restriction will be struck
down if it has the purpose or effect of creating a “substantial obstacle” to
the woman attempting to access an abortion.25
Approximately twenty-five years after Casey, Whole Woman’s Health
helps clarify when a state’s regulation of abortion becomes an “undue
burden” on a woman.26 But, before answering this constitutional question,
the Court first considered whether the petitioners were barred from bringing
their constitutional challenges by result of res judicata.27 The doctrine of
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 2303.
Id.
Id. at 2330 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973).
Id. at 153
Id. at 154.
Id.
See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
Id. at 877-78.
Id.
Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309-18.
Id. at 2304.
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claim preclusion, an aspect of res judicata, prohibits “‘successive litigation
of the very same claim’ by the same parties.”28 “[P]ublic policy dictates
that there be an end of litigation[,] that those who have contested an issue
shall be bound by the result of the contest, and that matters once tried shall
be considered forever settled between the parties.”29 But, the development
of new material facts can mean that a new case, and an otherwise similar
previous case, do not present the same claim.30
The Supreme Court next considered the constitutional issues. In
Casey, the Court laid out “undue burden,” the relevant level of scrutiny.31
The “[s]tate has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any
other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure
maximum safety for the patient.”32 But, “a statute, which while furthering
[a] valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman’s choice cannot be considered a permissible means of
serving its legitimate ends.”33 “[U]nnecessary health regulations that have
the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman
seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right.”34 Accordingly,
the rule announced in Casey, requires courts to consider the burdens that a
law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits that the law
confers.35 Courts then must consider whether any burden imposed on
abortion access is “undue.”36
The Court finally considered Texas’ argument regarding the effect of
H.B. 2’s severability clause. Generally, a severability clause provides that
if any provision of an act is found to be invalid, the remaining provisions
shall be severed and shall not be affected.37 Severability clauses express the
enacting legislature’s preference for a narrow judicial remedy.38
In recent years, many states have passed laws restricting abortion. In
fact, in 2016, antiabortion advocates in fourteen states passed thirty laws in

28. Id. at 2305 (citing New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001)).
29. Id. at 2331 (citing Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Assn., 283 U.S. 522, 525
(1931)).
30. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. f (1980).
31. Id. at 2309; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
32. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973).
33. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 877).
34. Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 878).
35. Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 887-98).
36. Id. at 2310.
37. See Severability Clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
38. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2319. According to the Court, “a severability
clause is an aid merely; not an inexorable command.” Id. (quoting Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 884-85 (1997)).
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an attempt to make obtaining an abortion difficult.39 The heated debate
continues regarding how far the government can go in regulating abortion
and when the regulation becomes unconstitutional. As such, the Supreme
Court granted the petitioners’ writ for certiorari and addressed this
controversial question.
III. ANALYSIS
In Whole Woman’s Health, the Supreme Court ruled the petitioners’
constitutional claims were not barred by res judicata.40 The Court ruled
both the admitting privileges requirement and the surgical center
requirement placed a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking
abortions and constituted an “undue burden” on abortion access.41 The
Court concluded that both H.B. 2 requirements violated the Constitution.42
The Court then looked at Texas’ three additional arguments, particularity
Texas’ severability clause argument, and found them unpersuasive.43
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION: TEXAS’ HOUSE BILL 2 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
On June 27, 2016,44 the Supreme Court voted 5-3 in favor of the
petitioners in Whole Woman’s Health.45 Justice Breyer wrote for the
majority.46 Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, Kennedy, and Sotomayor joined in
the majority opinion.47
1. Res Judicata and Petitioners’ Claims
First, the Court held res judicata neither bars the petitioners’ challenges
to the admitting privileges requirement nor prevents the Court from
awarding facial relief.48 The doctrine of claim preclusion, the relevant
aspect of res judicata, does not apply even though several of the petitioners
previously brought an unsuccessful facial challenge to the admitting

39. Amber Phillips, 14 states have passed laws this year making it harder to get an
abortion, THE WASHINGTON POST (June 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2016/06/01/14-states-have-passed-laws-making-it-harder-to-get-an-abortion-already-thisyear/#.
40. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309.
41. Id. at 2318.
42. Id. at 2319.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2292.
45. Id. at 2299.
46. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2299.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2304.
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privileges requirement in Abbott.49 Claim preclusion prohibits “successive
litigation of the very same claim” by the same parties.50 The Court
reasoned that the Abbott plaintiffs’ constitutional claim regarding the
admitting privileges requirement was not the same claim the petitioners
brought in this case.51 The Court explained that the Abbott plaintiffs
brought their challenge to the admitting privileges requirement prior to its
enforcement¾before many abortion clinics had closed and while it was still
unclear how many clinics would be affected.52 In this case, the petitioners
brought a challenge to the requirement after its enforcement¾after a large
number of clinics had in fact closed.53 Changed circumstances showing
that a constitutional harm is concrete may give rise to a new claim.54 Thus,
the Court concluded that the challenge brought by the petitioners in this
case and the one brought by the plaintiffs in Abbott were not the exact same
claim.55 The doctrine of claim preclusion did not bar a new challenge to the
admitting privileges requirement.56
The Court determined that res judicata did not preclude facial relief
even though the petitioners did not specifically request it.57 In addition to
asking for as-applied relief, the petitioners asked for any further relief as the
Court deemed just, proper, and equitable.58 The Court explained that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that a “final judgment should grant
the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded
that relief in its pleadings.”59 The Court had previously held if the
arguments and evidence show that a statutory provision is unconstitutional
on its face, an injunction prohibiting its enforcement is “proper”.60 The
Court concluded that nothing prevents it from awarding facial relief as the
appropriate remedy for the petitioners’ claims.61
Second, the Court also held that claim preclusion did not bar the
petitioners’ challenge to the surgical center requirement.62 The petitioners

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 2309.
Id. at 2305 (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001)).
Id. at 2304-07.
Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2306.
Id.
Id. at 2305.
Id. at 2307.
Id.
Id.
Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2307.
Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P 54(c)).
Id. (citing Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 333 (2010)).
See id.
Id. at 2309.

220

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 92: 213

were not required to bring their challenge to the surgical center provision
when they challenged the admitting privileges provision in Abbott.63 The
Court first explained that it has never suggested that challenges to two
distinctive statutory provisions serving two different functions must be
brought in a single suit.64 Lower courts normally treat challenges to distinct
regulatory requirement as separate claims even when they are part of a
larger regulatory scheme.65 At the time that the petitioners filed Abbott, the
Texas Department of State Health Services had not issued any rules
implementing the surgical center requirement.66 It was unclear whether the
rules would contain provisions granting special waivers to existing abortion
clinics, similar to those afforded to non-abortion surgical centers.67 In
addition, relevant factual circumstances changed between Abbott and the
present lawsuit; many abortion clinics had closed as a result of H.B. 2.68
For all of these reasons, the Court concluded that the doctrine of claim
preclusion did not prevent the petitioners from bringing a challenge to the
As such, none of the petitioners’
surgical-center requirements.69
constitutional claims were barred by res judicata.70
2. The Admitting Privileges Requirement
The Supreme Court held that the admitting privileges requirement
placed a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion and
constituted an undue burden on abortion access.71 The purpose of the
admitting privileges requirement was to help ensure women had easy access
to a hospital should complications arise during an abortion procedure.72
Before the enactment of the admitting privileges requirement in H.B. 2,
doctors who provided abortions were required to “have admitting privileges
or a close working arrangement with a physician(s) who has admitting
privileges at a local hospital.”73 Prior to the passage of H.B. 2, abortions in
Texas were considered very safe because there was a considerably low rate

63. Id.
64. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2308.
65. Id. (The surgical-center requirement and the admitting privileges requirement are two
distinct provisions of H.B. 2, which even have different enforcement dates.).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2306-07.
69. Id. at 2309.
70. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2297.
71. Id. at 2296.
72. Id. at 2311.
73. Id. at 2310 (citing 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §139.56 (2009)).
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of serious complications.74 There was no significant health-related problem
that the admitting privileges requirement helped cure.75 No evidence in the
record existed to depict that, compared to the prior law, the new law
advanced Texas’ interest in protecting women’s health.76
The evidence did, however, indicate that the admitting privileges
requirement placed a “substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice”
to have an abortion.77 For example, the number of facilities providing
abortions dropped by half, from about forty to about twenty, after Texas
began enforcing the admitting privileges requirement.78 The closures meant
“fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and increased crowding” at the
remaining clinics.79 After the admitting privileges provision went into
effect, many women had to drive further distances to get to an abortion
provider.80 These burdens, when viewed in light of the absence of any
health benefit, led the Court to conclude that the admitting privileges
requirement placed a substantial obstacle on a woman’s choice to have an
abortion.81 As such, the admitting privileges requirement constituted an
“undue burden” on abortion access.82
3. The Surgical-Center Requirements
The Court concluded that “the surgical-center requirement, like the
admitting privileges requirement, provide[d] few, if any, health benefits for
women and pose[d] a substantial obstacle to women seeking abortions.”83
The Court held that the surgical-center requirements constituted an “undue
burden” on women’s constitutional right to have abortions.84
Prior to the enactment of the surgical-center requirements, Texas law
already “required abortion facilities to meet a host of health and safety
requirements.”85 “H.B. 2 added the requirement that an ‘abortion facility’
meet the minimum standards . . . for ambulatory surgical centers under

74. Id. at 2311 (citing Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 684 (W.D.
Texas 2014)).
75. Id.
76. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2311.
77. Id. at 2309 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
877 (1992)).
78. Id. at 2312 (citing Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 681).
79. Id. at 2313.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2313.
83. Id. at 2318.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2314.
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Texas law.”86 The surgical-center requirements included, among other
things, detailed specifications relating to the size of the nursing staff,
building dimensions, and other building requirements.87 The Court
reasoned that the evidence in the record indicated the new requirements did
not benefit patients and were, therefore, unnecessary.88 The district court
was correct in determining that the “risks are not appreciably lowered for
patients who undergo abortions at ambulatory surgical centers as compared
to nonsurgical-center facilities.”89 The Court explained that the evidence
indicated that abortions taking place in an abortion facility were “safe – in
fact, safer than numerous procedures that took place outside of hospitals”
and to which Texas did not apply surgical-center requirement.90 Many
surgical-center requirements were inappropriate as applied to surgical
abortions.91 For these reasons, the Court agreed with the district court in
determining that many of the surgical-center requirements had such a
tangential relationship to patient safety in the context of abortion as to be
arbitrary.92 Because the surgical-center requirements did not provide better
care or more frequent positive outcomes, they were deemed unnecessary.93
The surgical-center requirements placed a substantial obstacle in the
path of women seeking an abortion.94 Expert testimony suggested that the
surgical-center requirements would increase by a factor of five, the number
of abortions to be performed by the remaining facilities.95 The Court
explained that an existing abortion facility could not likely perform five
times as many abortions as it currently does without increasing the size of
its facility and staff.96 The facilities would have to incur other considerable
costs to meet all of the surgical-center requirements.97 Women would
likely have to travel longer distances to get abortions in crammed-tocapacity superfacilities, which meet the surgical center requirements.98 In
addition, women seeking abortions would be less likely to receive
individualized attention, serious conversation, and emotional support

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 245.010 (West 2015)).
Id.
Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2315.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2316.
Id.
Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2316.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2318.
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doctors.99 As such, the Court inferred that quality of care would decline as
a result of the surgical-center requirements, which would be harmful to, not
supportive of, women’s health.100 The Court concluded that the surgicalcenter requirements made it much more difficult for women to access
abortion services;101 and, like the admitting privileges requirement,
provided few, if any health benefits for women.102 Therefore, the Court
held that the surgical-center requirements were unconstitutional.103
4. Texas’ Three Additional Arguments
The Court was not persuaded by Texas’ three additional arguments.104
First, Texas argued that facial invalidation of both challenged provisions
was precluded by H.B. 2’s severability clause.105 Texas contended that any
portion of H.B. 2 that was invalid must be severed and the remaining
portion must not be affected.106 The Court explained that when it has been
confronted with a facially unconstitutional statutory provision, it has never
been required to parse through the entire provision and determine whether
any single application of the provision may be valid.107 If a severability
clause could impose such a requirement on courts, legislatures would be
able to insulate unconstitutional statutes from most facial review.108 The
Court’s judicial remedy would involve quintessentially legislative work.109
Such an approach would inflict enormous costs on both courts and
litigants.110 The Court rejected Texas’ invitation to pave the way for
legislatures to immunize their statutes from facial review.111
Second, Texas claimed that, although required by Casey, the
challenged provisions “do not impose a substantial obstacle because the
women affected are not a ‘large fraction’ of Texan women ‘of reproductive
age . . . .’”112 The Court explained that Casey used the language “large
fraction” to refer to a large fraction of cases in which the provision was

99. Id.
100. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2318.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2319.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2320.
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relevant.113 In this case, as in Casey, the relevant denominator was women
for whom the provision was an actual, rather than an irrelevant,
restriction.114 The Court determined that the provisions should be judged
by the effect they have on women seeking abortions in Texas that would be
deterred by the provisions.115
Third, Texas looked for support in Simopoulos v. Virginia,116 a case in
which the Court upheld the surgical-center requirements as applied to
second-trimester abortions.117 The Court explained that unlike Simopoulos,
this case involved restrictions applicable to all abortions.118 The petitioner
in Simopoulos, unlike the petitioners here, waived any argument that the
regulation did not protect women’s health.119 The Court concluded
Simopoulos did not provide clear guidance in this case.120
5. Majority’s Conclusion
For the reasons above, the Court ruled the petitioners’ constitutional
claims were not barred by res judicata.121 Because they created an undue
burden, the Court ruled the admitting privileges requirement and the
surgical-center requirements violated the Constitution.122 Finally, the Court
looked at Texas’ three additional arguments and found them all
unpersuasive.123
B. THE CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer’s majority opinion.124 Justice
Ginsburg also filed a separate concurring opinion.125 In her concurrence,
Justice Ginsburg lifted the veil on Texas’ H.B. 2 laws and called them what
she believed they truly were—targeted regulation of abortion providers
laws.126

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id.
462 U.S. 506 (1983)
Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2320.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2309.
Id. at 2318.
Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2318.
Id. at 2299.
Id. at 2320.
Id. at 2321.
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1. Justice Ginsburg’s Concurrence: House Bill 2’s Restrictions
Are Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers Laws
In a two-page concurrence, Justice Ginsburg explained it was “beyond
rational belief that H.B. 2 could genuinely protect the health of women.”127
In truth, complications resulting from abortions are rare and typically not
dangerous.128 Many medical procedures, including childbirth, are far more
dangerous than abortion, yet are not subject to admitting privileges
requirement or surgical-center requirements.129 Justice Ginsburg reasoned
that when a state limits access to safe and legal procedures, women in
desperate circumstances may resort to unlicensed practitioners.130 Justice
Ginsburg concluded that targeted regulation of abortion providers laws, like
H.B. 2 that “do little or nothing for health, but rather strew impediments to
abortion” could not survive judicial inspection.131
C. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS
Two Justices wrote dissents in Whole Woman’s Health. Each
dissenting Justice disagreed with and criticized the majority for bending
basic rules because abortion was the subject at issue. Justice Thomas
dissented separately to criticize the Court’s habit of applying different rules
to different constitutional rights¾especially the right to abortion.132 Justice
Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, filed a second
dissenting opinion accusing the majority of disregarding basic
jurisprudential rules that apply in all other cases.133
1. Justice Thomas’s Dissent: Court Bends the Rules For Abortion
Cases
In the first Whole Woman’s Health dissent, Justice Thomas wrote about
his concerns with the Court’s tendency “to bend the rules when any effort to
limit abortion, or even speak in opposition to abortion, is at issue.”134
According to Justice Thomas, “A plaintiff either possesses the
constitutional right he is asserting or not – and if not, the judiciary has no

127. Id. at 2321 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 2320 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v.
Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 912 (7th Cir. 2015)).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2321 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
131. Id. (quoting Schimel, 806 F.3d at 921).
132. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2321 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 2330 (Alito, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 2321 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 954
(2000)).
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business creating ad hoc exceptions so that others can assert rights that
seem especially important to vindicate.”135 For example, Justice Thomas
contended that the Court had erroneously allowed doctors and clinics to
vicariously vindicate the constitutional right of women seeking abortions.136
Ordinarily, plaintiffs could not file suits to vindicate the rights of others.137
However, Justice Thomas noted that over time, the Court has shown a
particular willingness to undercut restrictions on third-party standing when
the right to abortion is at stake.138
Justice Thomas explained, “A law either infringes a constitutional
right, or not; there is not room for the judiciary to invent tolerable degrees
of encroachment.”139 Justice Thomas, for example, argued that whatever
level of scrutiny the majority applied to H.B. 2, it was not the undue-burden
test the Court articulated in Casey and its successors.140 Justice Thomas
argued the majority radically rewrote Casey’s undue-burden test.141 To
Justice Thomas, the majority’s undue-burden test looked less like the
Court’s post Casey precedents and far more like the strict scrutiny standard
that Casey rejected, under which only the most compelling rationales
justified restrictions on abortion.142 Justice Thomas explained that the
majority’s reconfiguration of the standard of scrutiny applicable to abortion
pointed to a deeper problem.143 “[T]he Court applies whatever standard it
likes to any given case, nothing but empty words separates our
constitutional decisions from judicial fiat.”144
Ultimately, Justice Thomas warned that unless the Court abided by one
set of rules to adjudicate constitutional rights, the Court would continue
reducing constitutional law to policy-driven value judgments.145 To Justice
Thomas, the majority’s embrace of a jurisprudence of rights-specific
exceptions and balancing tests was a concession of defeat.146
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2. Justice Alito’s Dissent: Court Fails to Apply Basic
Jurisprudential Principles
In the second Whole Woman’s Health dissent, Justice Alito, joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, wrote about his concern that the
majority disregarded basic rules that apply in all other cases.147 In his
lengthy dissent, Alito explained that the Court had an obligation to apply
basic jurisprudential rules in a neutral fashion, regardless of the subject of
the suit.148 “If anything, when a case involves a controversial issue, we
should be especially careful to be scrupulously neutral in applying such
rules.”149
First, Alito contended that claim preclusion should have barred the
petitioners from bringing their challenge to H.B. 2’s admitting privileges
provision.150 The petitioners had already lost their admitting privileges
challenge in Abbott.151 Under rules that apply in regular cases, the
petitioners could not relitigate the exact same claim in a second suit.152
Justice Alito explained that claim preclusion does not contain a “better
evidence” exception. 153 A plaintiff who loses in a first case cannot later
bring the same case simply because it has now gathered better evidence¾in
this case, additional abortion clinics closing.154 To Justice Alito, the Abbott
petitioners lost on the merits and chose not to petition the Supreme Court
for review.155 Justice Alito explained that the majority awarded a victory to
the petitioners on the very same claim that they unsuccessfully pressed in
Abbott.156
Second, Justice Alito explained that the doctrine of claim preclusion
also barred claims that were closely related to the claims unsuccessfully
litigated in a prior case.157 To Justice Alito, “it [was] evident that the
petitioners’ challenges to the admitting privileges requirement and the ASC
requirement [were] part of the same transaction or series of connect
transactions.”158 Justice Alito argued that the petitioners’ facial attack on
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the ambulatory surgical-center requirements, like the facial attack on the
admitting privileges requirement, should be precluded by res judicata.159
Next, Justice Alito suggested that while there was no doubt that H.B. 2
caused some abortion clinics to close, other clinics may have closed for
different reasons.160 Justice Alito pointed to a lack of evidence regarding
the capacity of the clinics that were able to comply with H.B. 2’s
requirements.161 He criticized the majority for inferring the surgical centers
that performed abortions after H.B. 2’s enactment lacked the necessary
capacity to perform all the abortions sought by women in Texas.162
Finally, Justice Alito argued that the majority was wrong to conclude
that the admitting privileges requirement and surgical-center requirements
must have been enjoined in their entirety.163 Any responsible application of
the H.B. 2 severability provision would leave much of the law intact.164
Justice Alito suggested that if the Court was unwilling to undertake the
careful severability analysis required, it should have remanded to the lower
courts for a remedy tailored to the specific facts shown in the case.165 To
Justice Alito, there was no reason to strike down all applications of the
challenged provisions.166
Justice Alito’s dissent highlighted his concern that the Court applies
basic rules inconsistently. He suggested that when the Court decides cases
on controversial issues, the Court should take special care to apply settled
procedural rules in a neutral manner.167 To Justice Alito, the majority failed
to apply basic jurisprudential principles in a neutral fashion.168
IV. IMPACT
The Whole Woman’s Health decision has a direct impact on states with
similar abortion laws to Texas’ H.B. 2. The Whole Woman’s Health ruling
will likely lead to abortion providers challenging their state’s admitting
privileges and surgical center laws. This case sets the national legal
precedent regarding admitting privileges and surgical-center requirements.
Because the Supreme Court concluded H.B. 2 was unconstitutional, other
159. Id. at 2342 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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states’ admitting privileges and surgical-center laws will likely also be
found unconstitutional. North Dakota, for example, has an admitting
privileges requirement that is very similar to H.B. 2. North Dakota Century
Code Section 14-02.1-04 (1) states in relevant part: “All physicians
performing abortion procedures must have admitting privileges at a hospital
located within thirty miles of the abortion facility and staff privileges to
replace hospital on-staff physicians at that hospital. These privileges must
include the abortion procedures the physician will be performing at abortion
facilities.”169
The Whole Woman’s Health decision does not automatically nullify
North Dakota’s admitting privileges law, which was passed in 2013.170
Because North Dakota’s admitting privileges provision is so similar to
Texas’ unconstitutional admitting privileges provision, North Dakota’s law
will likely be challenged. In fact, soon after the Court’s decision in Whole
Woman’s Health, Tammi Kromenaker, director of the Red River Women’s
Clinic in Fargo, North Dakota’s lone abortion clinic, said, “[W]e’ll certainly
take a look at it and figure out how to move forward.”171 She said, “At this
point, because it’s so fresh, our attorneys are still analyzing the decision.
But the bottom line is the fight does not end today.”172
If and when North Dakota’s admitting privileges law is challenged,
North Dakota’s courts will likely rely on Whole Woman’s Health.
Ultimately, North Dakota’s courts will have to decide whether the admitting
privileges law creates an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to have an
abortion. In making this determination, the courts must consider the effect
the law has on women seeking abortions. In 2014, 1,264 abortions were
performed in North Dakota.173 Furthermore, unlike in Texas, only one
provider performs abortions in North Dakota.174 If the lone abortion clinic
were forced to close, North Dakota women would have to travel outside of
the State to obtain safe and legal abortions. The court will also have to
determine if the burdens associated with the admitting privileges law, when
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viewed in light of any health benefits, place a substantial obstacle on a
woman’s choice to have an abortion.
Whole Woman’s Health does not necessarily dictate that North
Dakota’s admitting privileges requirement is unconstitutional. North
Dakota Attorney General Wayne Stenehjem said,
[I]t doesn’t guarantee a challenge to North Dakota’s law would
succeed because the clinic would have to show the law creates an
“undue burden” on a woman’s right to an abortion. “It might be a
challenge for them to claim an undue burden when in fact they
asked for and obtained admitting privileges.”175
In 2013, soon after North Dakota’s admitting privileges requirement
passed, the Center for Reproductive Rights (“the Center”) filed a lawsuit on
behalf of Fargo’s abortion clinic.176 The Center claimed that the admitting
privileges requirement effectively made abortion illegal in North Dakota.177
The lawsuit was subsequently removed from the docket, after a settlement
was reached between the State and the Fargo abortion clinic.178 Sanford
Health (“Sanford”) granted the Red River Women’s Clinic’s physicians
admitting privileges.179 Sanford agreed to “maintain admitting privileges
for the clinic’s physicians as long as they maintain certain training,
education, and certification requirements.”180 Because Sanford granted the
Red River Women’s Clinic’s physicians admitting privileges, North
Dakota’s admitting privileges law does not currently interfere with the
abortion clinic’s services. However, if for any reason Sanford decides to
deny the Red River Women’s Clinic’s physicians admitting privileges,
North Dakota’s admitting privileges law would likely cause North Dakota’s
lone abortion clinic to close.
Only time will tell if and when abortion providers will bring a lawsuit
challenging North Dakota’s admitting privileges law. If the law is
challenged, North Dakota courts will have to decide if the admitting
privileges law creates an undue burden on a woman’s right to have an
abortion. Whole Woman’s Health provides guidance on this question.
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V. CONCLUSION
In Whole Woman’s Health et al. v. Hellerstedt et al., the United States
Supreme Court held two controversial provisions of a Texas law, which
subjected abortion clinics to ambulatory surgical center standards and
required their physicians to obtain admitting privileges at nearby hospitals,
violated the Constitution. The Court held that res judicata did not bar the
petitioners’ challenges to either the admitting privileges requirement or the
surgical-center requirements. Whole Woman’s Health is likely the most
significant abortion case in the last twenty-five years, by reaffirming the
“undue burden” standard and likely impacting abortion restrictions in other
states, including North Dakota.
Dennis Pathroff*

*2018 J.D. candidate at the University of North Dakota School of Law. I would especially like to
thank Dr. Denise and Dr. Bob for their never-ending encouragement, guidance, and love.

